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| Elita Dreimane |
Rast risinājums KNAB jautājumā nebūs vienkārši, tādēļ, manuprāt, uz svara kausiem liekami ne tikai juridiski argumenti, bet, iespējams, vēl būtiskāki - kurai no valsts varām ir augstākā sabiedrības uzticēšanās? The Council of Europe's Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) rekomendācijās, uz kurām atsaucas arī Eiropas Komisija, ir minēta neatkarība no politiskās ietekmes.
Kā to vislabāk nodrošināt?
Izvērtējot abas pretkorupcijas konvencijas, mani būtiskākos apsvērumi (mazāk no juridiskajiem aspektiem), kas noteikti ņemami vērā, lemjot arī Latvijas galvenās pretkorupcijas novēršanas un apkarošanas iestādes virsuzraugu.
Starptautiskās normas un komentāri konkrēti nenorāda un neiezīmē, kādai valsts varai piederīga šāda specializēta tiesībaizsardzības iestāde. Būtiskākais nosacījums ir nodrošināt neatkarīgu un efektīvu funkciju izpildi, kā arī pietiekamus resursus un personāla apmācību. Līdz ar to svarīgākais nav tas, kurā no varas atzariem iestāde atrodas, jo tai jāuzrauga visu valsts varas pārstāvju darbība, arī pie tiesu varas, likumdošanas varas un izpildvaras piederošos. Tāpēc aspekts, ko, iespējams, visvairāk būtu jāņem vērā, ir - kurai no varām ir visaugstākais uzticības reitings sabiedrībā? Turklāt tiesu vara un tai piederošās iestādes ir vis neietekmējamā no politiskā spiediena, vismaz tā tam būtu jābūt.
Papildu - nav obligāti, ka gan korupcijas novēršanas, gan korupcijas apkarošanas funkcijas īsteno vienā iestādē. Risinājums var būt atbilstoši konkrētas dalībvalsts tiesiskajai sistēmai. Tāpat, piemēram, Valsts prezidenta Konstitucionālo tiesību komisija secināja, ka Satversmes 58.pants neparedz aizliegumu veidot neatkarīgas iestādes, bet ir interpretējams šādi: ja ir valsts pārvaldes iestādes, tad tās nav padotas Valsts prezidentam.
Valsts pārvaldē ir noteikta stingra iestāžu un amatpersonu hierarhija, t.sk. disciplināra vara pār zemāku iestādi vai amatpersonu. Savukārt pie pašreizējā regulējuma KNABā ir izmeklēšanas bloks, kuram nevar piemērot nekādu hierarhijas principu – izmeklētājs ir neatkarīgs pēc analoģiska principa kā prokurors. Cita lieta ir novēršanas bloka speciālisti, kuri ir pielīdzināmi ministrijas politikas izstrādātājiem, taču arī šajā aspektā dalībvalstij ir jānodrošina korupcijas novēršanas stratēģija u.c. Būtiski izprast, ka piesaistot pretkorupcijas iestādi pie izpildvaras un likumdošanas varas tomēr pastāv ievērojami lielāks risks, ka politiskā spiediena rezultātā KNAB nevar nodrošināt tādas politikas izstrādi un apstiprināšanu, kādu uzskata par pareizu. Iemesls ir vienkāršs - daudziem tādi pasākumi, pienākumi utt. var vienkārši nepatikt. Un ar to būs gana.
Lai nodrošinātu KNAB neatkarību, ir jāizdara daudzas atrunas par nepiemērošanu, un atkal nonākam pie tā, ka jādomā par atrašanos tādā resorā, kurā ir tiešs un konkrēts iestādes statusam un funkciju specifikai atbilstošs regulējums. Daudzas atrunas rada tiesisko nestabilitāti un priekšnoteikumus, kad atkal un atkal būs jāsaskaras ar neordinārām situācijām un jādomā - var vai nevar rīkoties pret šo iestādi un tās vadību. Jānovērš visi priekšnoteikumi, lai šādas situācijas nevarētu veidoties!
Komentāri pie šīs konvencijas:
Article 20 – Specialised authorities
95. This Article requires States Parties to adopt the necessary measures to ensure that persons or entities be appropriately specialised in the fight against corruption. This provision is inspired, inter alia, by the need of improving both the specialisation and independence of persons or entities in charge of the fight against corruption, which was stated in numerous Council of Europe documents. The requirement of specialisation is not meant to apply to all levels of law enforcement. It does not require in particular that in each prosecutor’s office or in each police station there is a special unit or expert for corruption offences. At the same time, this provision implies that wherever it is necessary for combating effectively corruption there are sufficiently trained law-enforcement units or personnel.
96. In this context, reference should firstly be made to the Conclusions and Recommendations of the 1st Conference for law-enforcement officers specialised in the fight against corruption, which took place in Strasbourg in April 1996. In the Recommendations, participants agreed, inter alia, that "corruption is a phenomenon the prevention, investigation and prosecution of which need to be approached on numerous levels, using specific knowledge and skills from a variety of fields (law, finance, economics, accounting, civil engineers, etc.). Each State should therefore have experts specialised in the fight against corruption. They should be of a sufficient number and be given appropriate material resources. Specialisation may take different forms: the specialisation of a number of police officers, judges, prosecutors and administrators or of the bodies or units specially entrusted with (several aspects of) the fight against corruption. The power available to the specialised units or individuals must be relatively broad and include right of access to all information and files which could be of values to the fight against corruption."
97. Secondly, it should be noted that the Conclusions and Recommendations of the 2nd European Conference of specialised services in the fight against corruption, which took place in Tallinn in October 1997, also recommended that "judges and prosecutors enjoy independence and impartiality in the exercise of their functions, are properly trained in combating this type of criminal behaviour and have sufficient means and resources to achieve the objective".
98. Thirdly, Resolution (97)24 on the 20 Guiding Principles for the fight against corruption, in its Principle n° 3, provides that States should "ensure that those in charge of the prevention, investigation, prosecution and adjudication of corruption offences, enjoy the independence and autonomy appropriate to their functions, are free from improper influence and have effective means for gathering evidence, protecting the persons who help the authorities in combating corruption and preserving the confidentiality of investigations".
99. It should be noted that the independence of specialised authorities for the fight against corruption, referred to in this Article, should not be an absolute one. Indeed, their activities should be, as far as possible, integrated and co-ordinated with the work carried out by the police, the administration or the public prosecutors office. The level of independence required for these specialised services is the one that is necessary to perform properly their functions.
100. Moreover, the entities referred to in Article 20 can either be special bodies created for the purposes of combating corruption, or specialised entities within existing bodies. These entities should have the adequate know-how and legal and material means at least to receive and centralise all information necessary for the prevention of corruption and for the revealing of corruption. In addition, and without prejudice to the role of other national bodies dealing with international co-operation, one of the tasks of such specialised authorities could also be to serve as counterparts for foreign entities in charge of fighting corruption.
APVIENOTO NĀCIJU ORGANIZĀCIJAS PRETKORUPCIJAS KONVENCIJA
6.pants
Preventīvā pretkorupcijas organizācija vai organizācijas
1. Katrai Dalībvalstij, ievērojot tās tiesību pamatprincipus, jānodrošina, ka tiek izveidota organizācija vai organizācijas, kura novērš korupciju ar tādiem līdzekļiem kā:
(a) Ieviešot politiku, kas norādīta šīs Konvencijas 5.pantā, un, kad nepieciešams, pārraugot un koordinējot tās īstenošanu;
(b) Paplašinot un izplatot zināšanas par korupcijas novēršanu.
2. Katrai Dalībvalstij, ievērojot tās tiesību pamatprincipus, jāpiešķir šī panta 1.punktā minētajai organizācijai vai organizācijām nepieciešamo neatkarību, lai minētā organizācija vai organizācijas spētu pildīt savus pienākumus efektīvi un brīvi no nepienācīgas ietekmēšanas. Tās būtu jānodrošina ar nepieciešamajiem materiālajiem resursiem un speciāli izglītotu personālu, kā arī ar apmācībām, kas šādiem darbiniekiem nepieciešama to amata pienākumu izpildei.
3. Katrai Dalībvalstij jāpaziņo Apvienoto Nāciju Organizācijas ģenerālsekretāram tās iestādes vai iestāžu nosaukumu un adresi, kuri var palīdzēt citām Dalībvalstīm izstrādāt un ieviest specifiskus pasākumus korupcijas novēršanai.
11.pants
Pasākumi, kas saistīti ar tiesu varas un kriminālvajāšanas dienestiem
1. Paturot prātā tiesu varas neatkarību un tās būtisko nozīmi korupcijas apkarošanā, katrai Dalībvalstij saskaņā ar tās tiesību sistēmas pamatprincipiem un bez kaitējuma tiesu varas neatkarībai jāveic pasākumi, lai stiprinātu godprātību un novērstu korupciju tiesu varai piederošo personu vidū. Šādi pasākumi var ietvert noteikumus par tiesu varai piederošo personu uzvedību.
2. Pasākumi, kas minēti šī panta pirmajā daļā, var tikt ieviesti un piemēroti arī attiecībā uz kriminālvajāšanas iestādēm tajās Dalībvalstīs, kurās šīs iestādes nav iekļautas tiesu varā, bet ir neatkarīgas līdzīgi kā tiesu varas iestādes.
36.pants
Specializētās iestādes
Katrai Dalībvalstij saskaņā ar tās tiesību sistēmas pamatprincipiem jānodrošina specializētu korupcijas apkarošanas tiesību aizsardzības organizāciju vai organizācijas, vai personu esamību. Šādai organizācijai vai organizācijām, vai personām ir jānodrošina nepieciešamā neatkarība saskaņā ar Dalībvalsts tiesību sistēmas pamatprincipiem, lai tās spētu pildīt savus pienākumus efektīvi un bez nepamatotas ietekmes. Šādām organizācijām vai organizāciju darbiniekiem vai personālam būtu jānodrošina atbilstoša apmācība un resursi, lai tie varētu pildīt savus pienākumus.
Komentāri pie šī konvencijas:
54. The Convention does not mandate the creation or maintenance of more than one body or organization for the above tasks. It recognizes that, given the range of responsibilities and functions, it may be that these are already assigned to different existing agencies.
55. The establishment of an anti-corruption body may require legislation.10 The body or bodies referred to in article 6 may be the same as those referred to in article 36, which deals with law enforcement anti-corruption functions (see A/58/422/Add.1, para. 11). That is, these bodies may have the authority to receive allegations of corruption and in some cases may have the authority to investigate corruption-related offences.11
56. Several articles of the Convention refer to the institutional framework required for an effective implementation of the Convention. Article 6 requires States parties to establish or maintain an anti-corruption body or bodies entrusted with preventive functions. Article 36 (Specialized authorities) requires States parties to “ensure the existence of a body or bodies or persons specialized in combating corruption through law enforcement”. In addition, paragraph 13 of article 46 (Mutual legal assistance) mandates the designation by States parties of a central authority competent to receive requests for mutual legal assistance (see also chap. IV, sect. C, below); and article 58 (Financial intelligence unit) obliges States parties to consider establishing a financial intelligence unit (FIU) responsible for receiving, analysing and disseminating reports of suspicious financial transactions (see also chap V, sect. E, below).12
57. While the Convention deals with preventive and law enforcement functions and corresponding bodies under different articles (arts. 6 and 36 respectively), States parties may decide to entrust one body with a combination of preventive and law enforcement functions.13
58. Public confidence and accountability in public administration are instrumental to the prevention of corruption and greater efficiency. So, article 10 requires States parties to take measures to enhance transparency in their public administration relative to its organization, functioning, decision-making processes and/or other aspects, in accordance with the fundamental principles of their law.
359. Article 36 requires States parties, in accordance with the fundamental principles of their legal system:
(a) To ensure they have a body or persons specializing in combating corruption through law enforcement;
(b) To grant the body or persons the necessary independence to carry out its or their functions effectively without undue influence; and
(c) To provide sufficient training and resources to such body or persons.
(h) Specialized authorities
462. Article 36 requires that States parties, in accordance with the fundamental principles of their legal system, ensure the existence of a body or bodies or persons specialized in combating corruption through law enforcement.
463. States parties may either establish an entirely new independent body or designate an existing body or department within an existing organization. In some cases, an anti-corruption body may be necessary to start combating corruption with fresh and concentrated energy. In other cases, it is often useful to enlarge the competence of an existing body to specifically include anticorruption.
Corruption is often combined with economic offences or organized criminal activities. It is thus a sub-specialization of police, prosecution, judicial and other (for example, administrative) bodies. Implementers are reminded that the creation of new bodies with hyper-specialization may be counterproductive, if it leads to overlapping of competences, a need for additional coordination, etc., that would be hard to resolve.
464. Such a body or bodies or persons must be granted the necessary independence, in accordance with the fundamental principles of the legal system of the State party, to be able to carry out their functions effectively and without any undue influence and should have the appropriate training and resources to carry out their tasks. An interpretive note states that the body or bodies may be the same as those referred to in article 6 (A/58/422/Add.1, para. 39).
465. Important in this context is that the domestic law enforcement functions of such a body must be seen in conjunction with the overall anti-corruption efforts, such as prevention (see chap. II of the present guide) and collaboration at the domestic and international levels (see chap. IV).
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